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STUDENT ARTICLE
STRATEGIES TO MEET THE NEEDS OF THE




Health insurance is our health care system's financial lifeblood. Ap-
proximately 181 million Americans have private health insurance,' yet
an additional 37 million Americans are uninsured.2 As a result, the un-
insured receive fewer health care services' and tend to be sicker than the
insured.4 This Article discusses state legislatures' attempts to meet the
needs of the uninsured and the challenges inherent in meeting those
needs. The uninsured population is described in Part II. The federal
Medicare program is described in Part III. State programs designed to
cover the uninsured are described in Part IV. These state programs in-
clude: (1) Medicaid; (2) state General Assistance-Medical programs; (3)
* J.D. Candidate, 1992, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis. M.H.A. Candi-
date, Graduate Program in Health Administration, Indiana University School of Public and Envi-
ronmental Affairs-Indianapolis. B.S.N., 1986, Indiana University School of Nursing-
Indianapolis. The author would like to thank Professor Eleanor Kinney and Dr. Robert Saywell for
their patience and support in the preparation of this Article. My thanks also to Julie Randolph,
Tom Gannon, and Phyllis Bonds of the Center for Law and Health at the Indiana University School
of Law-Indianapolis for their assistance and encouragement.
1. Office of National Cost Estimates, National Health Expenditures, 1988, 11 HEALTH CARE
FIN. REV. 1, 17 (1990).
2. PAMELA F. SHORT ET AL., NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH AND
HEALTH CARE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, UNINSURED AMERICANS: A 1987 PROFILE 3 (1988).
3. CHARLES J. DOUGHERTY, AMERICAN HEALTH CARE: REALITIES, RIGHTS, AND RE-
FORMS 12 (1988); Karen Davis & Diane Rowland, Uninsured & Underserved: Inequities in Health
Care in the United States, 61 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 149, 163 (1983).
4. Davis & Rowland, supra note 3, at 165.
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transitional insurance for former Medicaid and General Assistance-Med-
ical recipients; (4) state risk pools; (5) state catastrophic health plans; and
(6) state uncompensated care programs. Part IV also describes the Ha-
waii Prepaid Health Care Act, which is designed to cover workers, and
the Massachusetts Health Security Act, which is designed to cover all
state residents. Part V describes state legislation patterned after the Ca-
nadian Medicare program, which is designed to cover all state citizens
through a single state insurance plan. Finally, Parts VI and VII discuss
whether state health insurance programs can survive the friction that
arises in administering state insurance programs, the taxation of employ-
ers to finance program costs, and the infusion of government control into
the health care system.
II. THE UNINSURED POPULATION
Designing a state health insurance program for the uninsured re-
quires an examination of the uninsured population and their health care
needs. Over seventy-five percent of the uninsured population under age
sixty-five is employed.' Employers with twenty-five or fewer employees
are the least likely to provide their workers with health insurance bene-
fits.6 Unionization, salary, age, working hours, tenure, residential status,
and the kind of work performed may influence an employer's decision to
offer health insurance benefits.7 Employers are also beginning to shift
insurance costs for dependents onto employees.' As a result, the working
uninsured often cannot afford private health insurance, yet they are ineli-
gible for public health insurance programs.9
In today's American health care system, lack of insurance means
lack of health care.10 The uninsured may receive fewer medical services
because they are less likely to seek care, they are referred for fewer spe-
cialty services, or they are refused care by providers."1 The uninsured
5. U.S. BIPARTISAN COMM'N ON COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH CARE, 101ST CONG., IST SESS.,
A CALL FOR ACTION 2, 4 (Comm. Print 1990) [hereinafter A CALL FOR AcTIoN].
6. Id. at 2-3. See also SHORT, supra note 2, at 13.
7. SHORT, supra note 2, at 5. See also Gail R. Wilensky, Viable Strategies for Dealing with the
Uninsured, 6 HEALTH AFF. 33, 35 (1987) [hereinafter Wilensky, Strategies].
8. Randall R. Bovbjerg & William G. Kopit, Coverage and Care for the Medically Indigent:
Public and Private Options, 19 IND. L. REv. 857, 862 (1986) (in 1986, approximately three million
uninsured children lived in households with an insured adult). See also SHORT, supra note 2, at 4.
9. A CALL FOR ACTION, supra note 5, at 2.
10. But cf. Willard G. Manning et al., Health Insurance and the Demand for Medical Care:
Evidence from a Randomized Experiment, 77 AM. ECON. REv. 251, 263 (1987) ("no differential
response to health insurance coverage between the healthy and the sickly").
11. Bovbjerg & Kopit, supra note 8, at 864.
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poor also use fewer than half the medical services consumed by full year
Medicaid recipients with comparable levels of illness. 2 Further, the
working uninsured make fewer physician visits, use fewer prescription
drugs, and have fewer hospital stays than insured workers."3 Finding a
solution that meets the needs of these persons is today's health poli-
cymaker's challenge.
III. MEDICARE: THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S ROLE IN MEETING
THE NEEDS OF THE UNINSURED
The federal government plays a significant role in providing health
care benefits through the administration of the Medicare program (Title
XVIII of the Social Security Act). 4 In 1989, over thirty-three million
Americans received health care benefits under the Medicare program.' 5
Medicare benefits are divided into two parts: hospital insurance (Part
A)16 and supplemental medical insurance (Part B).17 Applicants eligible
for Part A benefits include persons sixty-five years old and older who are
entitled to Social Security Income or railroad retirement benefits and per-
sons with chronic renal disease.' 8 Part B benefits are available to Part A
recipients and other persons who are sixty-five years old and older who
pay a premium. 9 While Part A provides benefits for hospital and post-
hospital care,"0 Part B provides physician and outpatient services, includ-
ing durable medical equipment.2" The federal Medicare program, how-
ever, does not provide older persons with complete health care coverage.
For example, Medicare does not cover pharmaceutical, vision, hearing,
or preventive services.22 Consequently, state legislatures should include
12. John K. Iglehart, Medical Care of the Poor-A Growing Problem, 313 NEw ENG. J. MED.
59, 60 (1985).
13. Alan C. Monheit et al., The Employed Uninsured and the Role of Public Policy, 22 INQUIRY
348, 357 (1985) [hereinafter Monheit, Public Policy].
14. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395cce (1988 & Supp. 1 1989).
15. LINDA DEMIcOVICH, NATIONAL HEALTH POLICY FORUM, THE STATES AND THE UNIN-
SURED: SLOWLY BUT SURELY FILLING THE GAPS 5 (1990) [hereinafter SLOWLY BUT SURELY].
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1395c.
17. Id. § 1395j.
18. Id. § 1395c. See generally Eleanor D. Kinney, Making Hard Choices Under the Medicare
Prospective Payment System: One Administrative Model for Allocating Medical Resources Under a
Government Health Insurance Program, 19 IND. L. REv. 1151, 1158-61 (1986); H. Bradley South-
ern, Note, Medicare's End-Stage Renal Disease Program: Its Development and Implications for
Health Care Policy, 26 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 225 (1989).
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395o, 1395r.
20. Id. § 1395d. See generally Michael Neeley-Kvarme, Administration and Judicial Review of
Medicare Issues A Guide Through the Maze, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW. 2 (1981).
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395k, 1395L See generally Neeley-Kvarme, supra note 20, at 4-5.
22. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395d, 1395k, 1395y.
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older persons when they enact state health insurance programs.
IV. THE ROLE OF STATE LEGISLATURES IN MEETING THE NEEDS
OF THE UNINSURED
A. Medicaid
1. State Medicaid Programs
Medicaid (Title XIX of the Social Security Act)2 3 is administered
jointly by the federal government and the states.24 Persons eligible for
state Medicaid programs include the mandatory categorically needy, the
optional categorically needy, and the medically needy. 25 To qualify for
federal funds, state Medicaid programs must provide benefits to the
mandatory categorically needy. 26 The categorically needy include recipi-
ents of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC); aged, blind,
and disabled recipients of Social Security Income; and some low income
persons ineligible for AFDC or Social Security Income.27 A state's cate-
gorically needy population must also include children under one year old
who are at or near the federal poverty level and children under age seven
born after 1983 whose family income reached the federal poverty level
before 1991.28
A state is able to alter the size of its categorically needy population
by altering its AFDC or Social Security eligibility standards. For exam-
ple, a state legislature may influence Medicaid eligibility by raising the
Social Security Income standard through state supplemental payments.29
A state can also establish Medicaid eligibility criteria that are narrower
than the federal Social Security Income standards.3 ° Similarly, because
state legislatures have discretion in determining AFDC eligibility and
payment levels, they influence Medicaid eligibility for AFDC
recipients. 31
23. Id. §§ 1396-1396s (1988 & Supp. I 1989).
24. Id. §§ 1396, 1396a.
25. Id. § 1396a(a)(10); 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.1-.852 (1990). See also STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON
ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 100TH CONG., 2D SEss., MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK: BACKGROUND
DATA AND ANALYSIS 52 (Comm. Print 1988) [hereinafter MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK].
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10); 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.100-.136.
27. Id See generally 3 Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 14,311 (1990).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10); 42 C.F.R. § 435.117. See also MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK, supra
note 25, at 52; Kay Johnson, Medicaid Coverage for Low Income Children and Pregnant Women:
Five Years of Progress, 9 CHILDREN'S LEGAL RTS. .. 5, 6 (1988).
29. MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK, supra note 25, at 52.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(f); 42 C.F.R. § 435.121. See also MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK, supra note
25, at 62.
31. Jerry Cromwell et al., Defederalizing Medicaid: Fair to the Poor, Fair to Taxpayers?, 12 J.
[Vol. 27:111
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A state may also expand its categorically needy population by cover-
ing additional persons classified as the optional categorically needy. The
optional categorically needy population may include children who are
within the AFDC age standards, but whose families' incomes are below
the AFDC eligibility requirements,3 2 and persons in institutions whose
incomes are less than 300% of the Social Security payment level.33 This
flexibility allows a state to expand or contract the size of its categorically
needy population.
State Medicaid programs may also cover medically needy persons.
Programs for the medically needy provide benefits to persons who meet
the age and family requirements of the state's categorically needy pro-
gram, but who, after the payment of medical services, have incomes less
than 133 1/3% of the maximum AFDC payment for the same size fam-
ily.3a These programs may include benefits for pregnant women, chil-
dren up to one year old, and elderly and disabled persons whose incomes
are less than the federal poverty level.35
Medicaid benefits may differ depending on the recipient's eligibility
for the state's categorically needy or medically needy program. State
Medicaid programs must provide the categorically needy with benefits
for hospital, skilled nursing, rural health clinic, laboratory, X-ray, chil-
dren's health, and family planning services. 36 Benefits for the categori-
cally needy must also include outpatient, intermediate care facility,
dental, pharmaceutical, vision, and physical therapy services. 37
If a state elects to establish a program for the medically needy, that
program must provide the mandatory services for the categorically needy
to persons twenty-one to sixty-five years old who are in an institution
because they have a mental disorder or mental retardation, and must also
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 1, 2 (1987); See Frank J. Thompson, New Federalism and Health Care
Policy: States and the Old Question, ll J. HEALTH POL. PoL'Y & L. 647, 653 (1986) (those who
control eligibility requirements for AFDC and Social Security Income de facto control access to
Medicaid).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii); 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.200-.233. See also MEDICAID SOURCE
BOOK, supra note 25, at 52.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(IV); 42 C.F.R. § 435.211; 3 Medicare & Medicaid Guide
(CCH) 1 14,311 (1990).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C); 42 C.F.R. § 435.301. See generally MEDICAID SOURCE
BOOK, supra note 25, at 53; 3 Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 14,311.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii); 42 C.F.R. § 435.301. See generally MEDICAID SOURCE
BOOK, supra note 25, at 74-76.
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(C), 1396d(a); 42 C.F.R. § 440.210. See generally MEDICAID
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 25, at 93; Cromwell, supra note 31, at 7-9.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10); 42 C.F.R. § 440.210. See generally MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK,
supra note 25, at 93-96.
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include prenatal and delivery services, ambulatory care for persons under
eighteen years old and persons entitled to institutional services, and
home health services for persons entitled to care in a skilled nursing facil-
ity.38 In addition to these benefits, the states may provide the medically
needy with a variety of other preventive, diagnostic, and rehabilitative
services. 39 However, the benefits provided under the state's medically
needy program cannot exceed the benefits provided under its categori-
cally needy program."
The federal Medicaid statute gives state legislatures the ability to
expand their Medicaid programs to provide health insurance to the poor
without forfeiting federal funding. Twenty states have expanded their
Medicaid programs." One strategy for providing insurance through
Medicaid expansion is to offer Medicaid to otherwise ineligible workers
on a sliding scale basis.42 For example, Maine is designing a Disabled
Buy-In Program that will allow sliding scale Medicaid purchases for dis-
abled persons.43 Minnesota administers a Children's Health Plan that
provides outpatient services to children up to age eighteen who are from
families with incomes up to 185% of the federal poverty level. 4 In addi-
tion, Massachusetts administers a Medicaid "wrap around" plan for dis-
abled persons ineligible for Medicaid who have incomes up to 185% of
the federal poverty level.45
Because state legislatures control Medicaid eligibility and benefit re-
quirements, Medicaid coverage provided in states with similar popula-
tions in poverty can vary greatly. For example, Wisconsin and
Oklahoma each have approximately 395,000 people in poverty, yet in
1985, Wisconsin spent $942 million and Oklahoma spent $460 million in
Medicaid expenditures.46 Similarly, Massachusetts provides Medicaid to
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C); 42 C.F.R. § 440.220. See also MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK,
supra note 25, at 93.
39. MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK, supra note 25, at 96.
40. Id. at 93.
41. Lawrence S. Lewin & Marion E. Lewin, Financing Charity Care in an Era of Competition, 6
HEALTH AFF. 47, 50 (1987); Terese Hudson, State Associations Wary of Universal Health Plans,
HOSPITALS, Nov. 20, 1989, at 46.
42. Lewin & Lewin, supra note 41, at 51; Wilensky, Strategies, supra note 7, at 43. See also 3
Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 16,933 (1990).
43. INTERGOVERNMENTAL HEALTH POLICY PROJECT, RECENT STATE INITIATIVES FOR THE
UNINSURED 15 (1989) [hereinafter RECENT STATE INITIATIVES].
44. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256.936 (West Supp. 1991). See also RECENT STATE INITIATIVES,
supra note 43, at 17; SLOWLY BUT SURELY, supra note 15, at 11.
45. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 118E, § IB (West Supp. 1991). See also RECENT STATE
INITIATIVES, supra note 43, at 16.
46. Eleanor D. Kinney, Rule and Policy Making for the Medicaid Program: A Challenge to
[Vol. 27:111
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forty-six percent of its low income residents, but South Dakota provides
Medicaid to only fourteen percent of its low income residents.47 Thus,
the Medicaid program allows state legislatures flexibility in providing in-
surance for their needy residents.
2. The Arizona Health Care-Cost Containment System
A state can also replace its Medicaid program with an innovative
public health insurance plan.4" For example, in 1987, Arizona imple-
mented this strategy by contracting with the Health Care Financing Ad-
ministration (HCFA) to provide the Arizona Health Care-Cost
Containment System (AHCCCS).49 The Arizona government adminis-
ters this program by contracting with providers through a bidding pro-
cess.50 Persons eligible for AHCCCS benefits include AFDC and Social
Security Income recipients," the indigent,5" and the medically needy.53
The program's AFDC and Social Security recipient coverage allows Ari-
zona to receive federal Medicaid funds, and program supporters are
working to expand the program to include private health insurance bene-
fits.54 AHCCCS provides coverage for hospital, professional, laboratory,
children's screening, family planning, outpatient, dental, podiatry, trans-
plant, and transportation services. 5 It is not known, however, whether
AHCCCS costs Arizona less than a Medicaid program. 6
Federalism, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 855, 857 (1990); Saundra K. Schneider, Intergovernmental Influences
on Medicaid Program Expenditures, 48 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 756, 757 (1988).
47. DOUGHERTY, supra note 3, at 10. See also Cromwell, supra note 31, at I (states have great
flexibility in determining eligibility, coverage, and reimbursement methods).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(b).
49. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-2901 to -2920 (1986 & Supp. 1990). See generally 3 Medi-
care & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 15,554 (1990); Nelda McCall et al., Evaluation of the Arizona
Health Care Cost-Containment System, 7 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 77 (1985); Ronald J. Vogel,
AHCCCS: A New Medicare-Medicaid Model in Arizona, 309 NEw ENG. J. MED. 934 (1983); RAN-
DOLPH A. DESONIA & KATHLEEN M. KING, INTERGOVERNMENTAL HEALTH POLICY PROJECT,
STATE PROGRAMS OF ASSISTANCE FOR THE MEDICALLY INDIGENT 79 (1985) [hereinafter STATE
PROGRAMS].
50. ARIZ. REV. STAT. Am. §§ 36-2903, 36-2906. See also Vogel, supra note 49, at 934.
51. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-2901.
52. Id. §§ 11-297, 36-2901 (Supp. 1990).
53. Id. §§ 36-2901, 36-2905. See also McCall, supra note 49, at 77; Vogel, supra note 49, at
935.
54. McCall, supra note 49, at 77, 85; Bradford L. Kirkman-Liff et al., The Evolution of Ari-
zona's Indigent Care System, 6 HEALTH AFF. 46, 49 (1987).
55. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2907. See also McCall, supra note 49, at 77.
56. See Vogel, supra note 49, at 934, 936.
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B. State General Assistance-Medical Programs
State General Assistance-Medical (GA Medical) programs also pro-
vide health insurance for the uninsured. GA Medical programs, how-
ever, do not qualify a state for federal funds.57 Twenty-two states
administer GA Medical programs. These states are: Alaska, Connecti-
cut, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, Washington,
and Wisconsin.58 Persons eligible for GA Medical programs include the
poor who do not qualify for AFDC payments or Social Security Income,
single persons without children who are unable to work, and families in
which both parents do not work.59 In general, GA Medical coverage is
similar to the benefits provided by the state's Medicaid program." These
programs may include coverage for hospital, professional, laboratory, X-
ray, emergency dental, pharmaceutical, vision, and transportation serv-
ices.6" By providing GA Medical programs, a state can provide health
care coverage to persons who are ineligible for Medicaid. Although the
states must fund these programs without federal assistance, they provide
an opportunity for decreasing the size of the uninsured population.
C. Transitional Insurance
Another approach to meeting the needs of the uninsured is the pro-
vision of transitional insurance to the poor who lose their Medicaid or
GA Medical benefits when they accept employment.62 Maryland, Mas-
sachusetts, Michigan, and New Jersey provide transitional insurance pro-
grams to their former Medicaid and GA Medical recipients.63
Generally, transitional insurance covers the same health care services
provided by public assistance programs. 64 However, the need for transi-
tional health insurance programs was reduced by the Family Support
57. RECENT STATE INITIATIVES, supra note 43, at 8-10.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 8.
60. Id. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-3-310 (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5111.02 (Baldwin
1989); 62 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 442.1 (Supp. 1991).
61. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-274 (West Supp. 1990); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 3185 (West Supp. 1990); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 74.09.700(2)(a) (West Supp. 1991).
62. RECENT STATE INITIATIVES, supra note 43, at 8-10.
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Act of 198865 which requires state governments to provide newly em-
ployed AFDC recipients with an additional twelve months of Medicaid
or private insurance coverage. 66 Nevertheless, states may provide addi-
tional benefits to former Medicaid recipients by furnishing transitional
coverage beyond the twelve months required by the Family Support Act.
D. State Risk Pools
In addition to public insurance programs, Connecticut, Florida, Illi-
nois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Mex-
ico, North Dakota, Oregon, Tennessee, Washington, and Wisconsin
administer state risk pool programs.67 In these programs, states main-
tain pooling arrangements with private insurers to provide benefits to
61medically uninsurable persons. Persons eligible for participation are
those who do not qualify for public insurance, who are rejected by pri-
vate insurers, or who pay private insurance premiums that exceed risk
pool rates.69
State risk pools may also include benefits for other uninsured per-
sons. For example, Connecticut's risk pool is available to all residents
who are ineligible for Medicare.70 In 1987, Oregon enacted a Health
Insurance Pool to approve contracts with insurance carriers and to set
premium rates for employers and employees.71 The Oregon Health In-
surance Pool, however, does not provide employee dependent coverage.72
State risk pools provide a wide variety of benefits. These programs
typically include benefits for hospital, professional, skilled nursing facil-
ity, home health, X-ray, laboratory, oral surgery, anesthesia, and transfu-
sion services.73 Risk pool benefits may also include coverage for
prescription drugs and contraceptives, oxygen therapy, physical therapy,
65. The Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
66. Id. § 401, 102 Stat. at 2392-96. See also [1989-1 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid
Guide (CCH) 37,477; RECENT STATE INITIATIVeS, supra note 43, at 22.
67. RECENT STATE INITIATIVES, supra note 43, at 33-37.
68. See generally Susan S. Laudicina, State Health Risk Pools: Insuring the "Uninsurable' 7
HEALTH App. 97 (1988).
69. RECENT STATE INITIATIVES, supra note 43, at 33-37.
70. See Monheit, Public Policy, supra note 13, at 361.
71. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 653.705-.785 (1989). See also RECENT STATE INITIATiVES, supra note
43, at 50.
72. OR. REv. STAT. § 653.745(4). See also RECENT STATE INrrIATIvEs, supra note 43, at 50.
73. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.6498 (1984 & Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-10-3
(Burns Supp. 1991); IOWA CODE ANN. § 514E.4 (West 1988 & Supp. 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN.




Haycox: Strategies to Meet the Needs of the Uninsured: Can the States Res
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1991
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
speech therapy, radioactive materials, and prostheses.74
Unfortunately, state risk pool premiums are too expensive to pro-
vide adequate health insurance benefits for most uninsured persons.7 In
many states, risk pool premiums may cost up to 150% of average insur-
ance premium rates.76 Participating insurance companies pay the differ-
ence in premium incomes and program expenses.77 Nevertheless, the
risk pool concept may provide a viable alternative for state legislatures to
consider as they develop programs for the uninsured.
E. State Catastrophic Health Plans
State legislatures may also provide the uninsured with health care
benefits through catastrophic health insurance programs. New Jersey
and New York have adopted this strategy and administer catastrophic
health programs. 78 Generally, private insurance benefits must be ex-
hausted before an individual may receive benefits.79 However, disabled
persons who do not qualify for Medicaid may be eligible without ex-
hausting their benefits.Y°
State catastrophic health insurance programs provide a broad range
of benefits. Standard benefits included under these programs are hospi-
tal, professional, skilled nursing facility, clinic, home health, laboratory,
X-ray, dental, vision, and rehabilitation services, as well as benefits for
medical equipment and supplies, prostheses, drugs, physical therapy, and
speech therapy.81 Catastrophic health plans may be financed by state
revenues, deductibles, and copayments.82
State catastrophic health plans may ease the burden of costly ill-
nesses, but they do not provide benefits until a potential recipient de-
pletes all other health insurance resources. As a result, states adopting a
74. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.6498; IND. CODE. ANN. § 27-8-10-3; IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 514E.4; MINN. STAT. § 62E.06; MONT. CODE. ANN. § 33-22-1511; TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-39-
112.
75. STATE PROGRAMS, supra note 49, at 34.
76. RECENT STATE INrrIrTvEs, supra note 43, at 38-40.
77. STATE PROGRAMS, supra note 49, at 34.
78. RECENT STATE INITIATIVES, supra note 43, at 18-19. Rhode Island administered a cata-
strophic health plan until July 1, 1990 when budget problems forced the state legislature to termi-
nate the program. Alaska, Maine, and Minnesota also terminated their programs. SLOWLY BUT
SURELY, supra note 15, at 14.
79. RECENT STATE INITIATIVES, supra note 43, at 18-19.
80. Id. at 14.
81. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 369-c (McKinney 1991).
82. RECENT STATE INrIATIVES, supra note 43, at 14.
[Vol. 27:111
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catastrophic health plan must provide additional programs to effectively
meet the needs of the uninsured.
F. State Uncompensated Care Programs
State uncompensated care programs provide reimbursement to hos-
pitals that provide medical services to the uninsured. Hospitals that treat
a high proportion of uninsured persons experience greater financial stress
than those hospitals that treat few uninsured persons.8 3 Consequently,
forty-three states ease this burden by reimbursing hospitals for care pro-
vided to persons with minimal resources.84
A variety of innovative strategies are used to finance state uncom-
pensated care programs. Generally, these reimbursements are provided
from state and local revenues.8 5 Other revenue sources are also available.
Maryland, Massachusetts, and New Jersey supplement general revenue
reimbursements with third party payer assessments.86 California and
Minnesota use cigarette taxes.8" Kentucky, New Jersey, and Penn-
sylvania use lottery proceeds.88 Finally, Alabama, California, Georgia,
Montana, North Carolina, Tennessee, and West Virginia solicit dona-
tions from hospitals to help reallocate the uncompensated care burden. 9
A different approach to financing these programs is used in Florida,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and South Car-
olina where revenue pools were developed to reimburse hospitals for
charity care costs."° Under this approach, hospitals are required to pay a
surcharge on total revenues which is redistributed in proportion to each
hospital's charity care costs.9 1 States implementing uncompensated care
programs may be able to contribute to hospitals' financial stability. Yet,
because these payments are provided directly to hospitals, they do not
decrease the size of the uninsured population.
G. The Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act
Hawaii administers an innovative state health insurance program.
83. Iglehart, supra note 12, at 60.
84. RECENT STATE INITIATIVES, supra note 43, at 65-66.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 67, 69-71.
87. Id. at 77.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 78.
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This program, codified in the 1974 Prepaid Health Care Act,92 was en-
acted to provide insurance for the state's gap group individuals. 93 Gap
group individuals are persons who: (1) have too much income to qualify
for Medicaid; (2) are not insured by an employer; (3) choose not to
purchase health insurance; or (4) are dependents who are not included in
their parents', guardian's, or spouse's health insurance plan.94
Hawaii's small population of uninsured persons is the primary rea-
son for the Prepaid Health Care Act's success. 9" Prior to the Prepaid
Health Care Act, ninety percent of Hawaii's population was insured. 96
The Act maintains Hawaiians' high health insurance level by requiring
employers to provide health insurance to employees who work twenty
hours per week for four consecutive weeks.97 Consequently, the Act does
not cover seasonal workers, part-time workers, or public assistance recip-
ients.98 Further, employers are not required to provide health insurance
benefits for workers who are covered by another insurance plan, a pre-
paid health care plan, the state's medical assistance plan, or a parents',
guardian's, or spouse's health care plan.99 Employers are also not re-
quired to provide health insurance benefits for their workers' depen-
dents.1" Despite these exceptions, Hawaii has the smallest uninsured
population in the nation.101
Financial support for the the Prepaid Health Care Act is obtained
from various sources. Legislative appropriations are an important ele-
ment in the Act's funding."° Employee contributions are restricted to
1.5% of their gross salary.103 Employers must pay at least half of their
employees' premiums and any difference after the employee's contribu-
tion is met. 1" Small business relief is available for businesses with fewer
than eight employees if paying health insurance premiums creates a
92. HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 393-1 to -51 (1985 & Supp. 1990)
93. Id. § 431N-3 (Supp. 1990).
94. Id.
95. ERISA: Exemption from Preemption for Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act: Hearings on
H.R. 4046 Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the Comm. on Education and
Labor, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1982) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of Betty Hirozawa, Govern-
ment Affairs Committee, Hawaii Chamber of Commerce).
96. Id.
97. HAW. REv. STAT. § 393-14.
98. See id.
99. Id. § 393-17.
100. Id. § 393-21. RECENT STATE INnTATrVES, supra note 43, at 43.
101. SLOWLY BUT SURELY, supra note 15, at 6.
102. HAW. REv. STAT. § 431N-3.
103. Id. § 393-13.
104. Id. See also RECENT STATE INmrrATis, supra note 43, at 43.
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hardship.10 5
The Prepaid Health Care Act provides a broad range of coverage
and allows some flexibility for employers to tailor their plans to the needs
of their business and their employees. The Act mandates insurance cov-
erage for hospital, physician, surgical, maternity, substance abuse, and
preventive services. 6 Employers may choose the insurance plan they
will offer their workers, or they may self-fund by paying directly for their
employees' health services. 107 The Prepaid Health Care Act Advisory
Counsel also has the authority to approve plans providing services vary-
ing from the statutory requirements. 1 8
Despite the broad range of services provided under the Prepaid
Health Care Act and the numerous employees who enjoy these services,
businesses were reluctant to support it. In Standard Oil Company v. Ag-
salud, ' 9 the Standard Oil Company challenged the Act's validity. Stan-
dard Oil resisted expanding its multistate employee benefit plan to meet
the Act's requirements, and argued that the 1974 Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA)" ° preempted the Prepaid Health Care
Act.'I
These arguments proved to be successful when the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that ERISA preempts the Hawaii Prepaid Health
Care Act."12 ERISA regulates private employee benefit and pension
plans.1 3 Under ERISA, an employee benefit plan is any plan maintained
by an employer to provide benefits for medical, surgical, or hospital
105. HAW. REV. STAT. § 393-45.
106. Id. § 393-7. RECENT STATE INrTrVE, supra note 43, at 43.
107. HAw. REv. STAT. § 393-12.
108. Id. § 393-7(b).
109. 442 F. Supp. 695, 697 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd, 633 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd mem.,
454 U.S. 801 (1981).
110. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. I 1989).
111. Standard Oil, 442 F. Supp. 695, 697. See generally Michael G. Pfefferkorn, Comment,
Federal Preemption of State Mandated Health Insurance Programs Under ERISA-The Hawaii Pre-
paid Health Care Act in Perspective, 8 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 339 (1989).
112. Standard Oil, 633 F.2d at 766.
113. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461.
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care." 4 If a state law "relate[s] to employee benefit plans," it is pre-
empted;115 however, laws that "regulate insurance" are not pre-
empted.' 16 The court reasoned that the Prepaid Health Care Act "must
'relate to' employee benefit plans within the meaning of ERISA's broad
preemption provision."' 17  Yet, even after Standard Oil, employers in
Hawaii continued to provide workers with insurance benefits that met
the Act's requirements.' 18
In 1983, the Hawaii government successfully petitioned Congress to
exempt the Act from ERISA regulation. 19 Whether Congress will ex-
empt other employer-based programs from ERISA regulation is unclear.
As a result, because Hawaii had a high percentage of insured citizens
before the Prepaid Health Care Act was passed, and because the state
legislature obtained an exemption from ERISA regulation for the Act, its
duplication is unlikely. 2
114. Id. § 1002(1).
115. Id. § 1144(a). See General Elec. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 891 F.2d 25,29 (2d
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2603 (1990) (A state law is "related to" employee benefit plans
when it has a "connection with or reference to" such plans, "it purports to regulate.., the terms
and conditions" of such plans, or "it proscribes the type and amount of an employer's contribu-
tion."); Insurance Bd. v. Muir, 819 F.2d 408,410-11 (3rd Cir. 1987) (ERISA preempts Pennsylvania
mandated benefits law); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 571 F.2d 502, 504 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978) (ERISA preempts the 1975 Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan Act).
116. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2). See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 746
(1984) (Massachusetts mandated benefits law requiring coverage for hospital and surgical expenses
in employee health care plans is the regulation of insurance reserved to the states by the McCarren-
Ferguson Act and is therefore not preempted); Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Bell, 798 F.2d 1331, 1334
(10th Cir. 1986) (Kansas mandated benefits law requiring coverage for newborn infants is the regula-
tion of insurance reserved to the states by the McCarren-Ferguson Act); Michigan United Food &
Commercial Workers Unions v. Baerwaldt, 767 F.2d 308, 312-13 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1059 (1986) (Michigan mandated benefits law requiring coverage for substance abuse is the
regulation of insurance within the savings clause and is therefore not preempted); Wadsworth v.
Whaland, 562 F.2d 70, 78 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 980 (1978) (New Hampshire man-
dated benefits law requiring coverage for mental health services is the regulation of insurance re-
served to the states by the McCarren-Ferguson Act and is therefore not preempted). See generally
Michael S. Ackerman, Note, ERISA: Preemption of State Health Plan Laws and Worker Well-
Being, 1981 ILL. L. REv. 825 (1981); Lawrence A. Vranka, Jr., Note, Defining the Contours of
ERISA Preemption of State Insurance Regulation: Making Employee Benefit Plan Regulation an
Exclusively Federal Concern, 42 VAND. L. REv. 607 (1989).
117. Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 633 F.2d 760, 766 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd mem., 454 U.S. 801
(1981).
118. Hearings, supra note 95, at 27 (statement of Albert H. Yuen, President, Hawaii Medical
Services Association).
119. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(5).
120. See Hearings, supra note 95, at 121 (testimony of Honorable Spark M. Matsunaga, U.S.
Senator, Hawaii).
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H. The Massachusetts Health Security Act
The Massachusetts government implemented a progressive ap-
proach to meeting its uninsured residents' needs by enacting the Health
Security Act. The Health Security Act resulted from tensions created by
the implementation of a hospital revenue pool designed to compensate
hospitals for care provided to the medically indigent. In 1985, the Mas-
sachusetts legislature implemented the hospital revenue pool and fi-
nanced it through a surcharge on hospital bills.121 In return for these
uncompensated care payments, hospitals were required to provide free
care to the medically indigent.' 22 By 1987, the surcharge grew to
13.25% of hospital revenues, and hospitals complained that inflation
costs and shortfalls from Medicare payments exceeded their
reimbursements. 123
In 1987, Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis introduced the
Massachusetts Health Partnership (Partnership). 24 The Partnership
was designed to provide health insurance benefits to high risk individu-
als, Medicare recipients, public employees, unemployment compensation
recipients, and uninsured workers. 2 ' The Massachusetts legislature,
however, did not pass the Partnership.'26
Later in 1987, Senator Pat McGovern proposed the Health Security
Act which was passed on April 21, 1988.127 An alliance of Massachu-
setts universities, hospitals, state agencies, and insurance carriers sup-
ported the Health Security Act's implementation. 28 To gain support for
the Act, the state pledged $200,000,000 to compensate hospitals for ex-
penses exceeding their Medicare payments.' 29 Yet, because of increasing
budget demands, Governor Dukakis refused to release much of the
121. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 118F, § 15 (West Supp. 1991). See generally, Greg Scandlen,
Massachusetts Universal Health Insurance Law: A Blueprint for the States?, 17 TAX MGMT. COM-
PENSATION J. 3 (1989); RECENT STATE INITIATIVES, supra note 43, at 70.
122. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 11SF, § 15. See Scandlen, supra note 121, at 3.
123. Alan Sager, Prices of Equitable Access" The New Massachusetts Health Insurance Law, 18
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 21, 22 (1988); Scandlen, supra note 121, at 3.
124. Linda A. Bergthold, Purchasing Power: Business and Health Policy Change in Massachu-
setts, 14 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 435, 441 (1989); Scandlen, supra note 121, at 3.
125. Scandlen, supra note 121, at 3.
126. Id. at 4.
127. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 11SF, §§ 1-20 (West Supp. 1991); Alan Sagar, Making Uni-
versal Health Insurance Work in Massachusetts, 17 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 269, 275 (1989)
[hereinafter Sagar, Universal Health].
128. Scandlen, supra note 121, at 3.
129. Sager, Universal Health, supra note 127, at 276.
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money appropriated for the Act's implementation. 3 ' In addition, be-
cause the Massachusetts i.zgislature had difficulty balancing its budget, it
paid the first two years of Medicare shortfall payments only after the
Massachusetts Hospital Association sued the state government for the
money. 131 The state has now capped the amount of debt hospitals can
charge to the hospital revenue pool, and the Massachusetts Hospital As-
sociation has again filed suit.132
Despite these difficulties, the Massachusetts government continues
to administer the Health Security Act. The Act continues, however, to
strain the Massachusetts budget as well as the budgets of employers and
employees. The Health Security Act only requires that employers pro-
vide health insurance benefits which typically are included in employer
and employee sponsored health benefit plans, 133 and only employers who
do not provide health insurance for their employees are taxed. 134 Em-
ployers with more than five employees who do not provide employee
health insurance benefits are assessed two surcharges.135  The first
surcharge is the medical security surcharge which is assessed at $1,680
per employee.' 36 The second surcharge is assessed at $16.80 per em-
ployee and is used to provide health benefits for unemployment compen-
sation recipients. 37 In addition, a sliding scale based on family income is
used to determine employees' contributions. 38 Because surcharges are
imposed when employers fail to provide employee health insurance bene-
fits, the Health Security Act is described as a "pay or play" system.139
To alleviate the financial strain resulting from the payment of health
insurance premiums, the Health Security Act provides relief for small
businesses. The Act established a small business pool to help businesses
130. Id.
131. Id.; Karen Pallarito, Problems Prompt Thoughts About Massachusetts Universal Health
Plan, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Sept. 24, 1990, at 34, 35.
132. SLOWLY BUT SURELY, supra note 15, at 8.
133. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 118F, § 6(i) (West Supp. 1991).
134. Id., ch. 151A, § 14G (West Supp. 1991).
135. Id. See also Scandlen, supra note 121, at 5.
136. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151A, § 14G(c) (the $1,680 surcharge is calculated as 12% of
the first $14,000 of wages per employee).
137. Id. § 14G(a) (the $16.80 surcharge is calculated as .12% of the first $14,000 of wages per
employee). In 1990, the Massachusetts legislature postponed the implementation of these
surcharges. The legislative changes moved the start of the first surcharge to 1994 and moved the
start of the second surcharge to 1992. These changes, however, were vetoed by Governor Dukakis
later that year. SLOWLY BUT SURELY, supra note 15, at 7.
138. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 118F, § 11(4) (West Supp. 1991). See also RECENT STATE
INTIATIVES, supra note 43, at 45.
139. Sager, Universal Health, supra note 127, at 270.
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with up to six full-time employees.14° In addition, a health insurance
hardship trust fund provides assistance for any business whose insurance
payments are equal to five percent of its gross revenues. 141 A two year
tax credit is also available to employers who have up to fifty-one employ-
ees, are providing employee health insurance benefits for the first time,
and pay up to fifty percent of their employees' premiums.142 Conse-
quently, large businesses may try to benefit from these provisions by reor-
ganizing into smaller units to receive small business assistance. 143
The Health Security Act also established the Department of Medi-
cal Security to arrange insurance for persons who are not eligible for a
health insurance plan, medical assistance program, or third party pay-
ment for health services. 144 Despite its broad scope, the Act leaves some
Massachusetts residents uninsured. For example, the elderly who re-
quire coverage beyond their Medicare benefits remain underinsured and
part-time and seasonal workers are excluded from the statute's
requirements.
145
The considerable monetary support needed to insure Massachusetts
residents through the Health Security Act is reflected in the financial
projections for its implementation. The Dukakis administration esti-
mated that it needed $600,000,000 to finance the Act's five year phase-in
period."4 The Massachusetts House of Representatives, however, esti-
mated that the phase-in period would cost $1,000,000,000.147 Similar
cost estimates ranged up to $2,000,000,000.148 The current Massachu-
setts budget provides $34,000,000 to fund the Act, and income-based pre-
miums may be imposed to maintain its financial stability. 149 Given these
projections, it is not surprising that the Act was once described as a
"leaking, heavily laden boat asked to take on more passengers in worsen-
ing weather." 110
140. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 11SF, § 11(4). See also Scandlen, supra note 121, at 5.
141. MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 11SF, §§ 11(6), 13 (West Supp. 1991). See also Scandlen,
supra note 121, at 5.
142. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151A, § 14G(f). See also Scandlen, supra note 121, at 5.
143. Scandlen, supra note 121, at 7.
144. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 118F, §§ 3, 5, 8 (West Supp. 1991). See also Scandlen, supra
note 121, at 4.
145. Mandated Coverage: Massachusetts' Ordeal, HOSPiTALS, July 20, 1988, at 66, 70 (interview
with Stephen Hegarty, President, Massachusetts Hospital Association and David Kinzer, President
1973-85, Massachusetts Hospital Association).
146. Scandlen, supra note 121, at 6.
147. Id.
148. William A. Leitner, Massachusetts Omen or Anomaly?, 58 ALA. MED. 7, 13 (1988).
149. SLOWLY BUT SURELY, supra note 15, at 8.
150. Sager, Universal Health, supra note 127, at 279.
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Further complications increase the likelihood that the Health Secur-
ity Act will be discontinued. Because the Act is costly and a new Massa-
chusetts governor has replaced Mr. Dukakis, the Massachusetts
legislature may repeal the Act before the phase-in period is completed.151
Massachusetts business owners argue that the Health Security Act is pre-
empted by ERISA, but they have not yet challenged the statute's validity
in court."5 2 ERISA may not preempt the Health Security Act because
the statute does not directly require employers to provide health insur-
ance coverage to their employees." 3 If challenged, the Massachusetts
government may argue that the Health Security Act is a legitimate exer-
cise of the state's taxing power that assesses all employers equally. 154
This argument is weakened as more exceptions are created for part-time
and seasonal workers.' 5 With these exceptions, the Act appears to use a
backdoor approach to employee benefit regulation leaving uncertain
whether the Health Security Act is preempted by ERISA. Although
other state legislatures may consider patterning a program after the
Health Security Act, the Act's uncertain future and Massachusetts'
unique political environment make its duplication unlikely. 5 6
V. THE CANADIAN MEDICARE PROGRAM: A MODEL FOR
THE STATES
The Canadian national health insurance program (Medicare) 5 7 pro-
vides a viable alternative for states to consider as they develop programs
for the uninsured. The Canadian Medicare statute requires that the
provinces provide health insurance for their entire population.' 58 Before
Medicare, one in five Canadian residents did not have health insurance
benefits.'59 As a result of this statute, approximately ninety-eight percent
151. See Pallarito, supra note 131, at 36; SLOWLY BUT SURELY, supra note 15, at 7, 9.
152. Sager, Universal Health, supra note 127, at 276.
153. Scandlen, supra note 121, at 6.
154. But see Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 442 F. Supp. 695, 710 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd, 633
F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd mem., 454 U.S. 801 (1981) (concluding that the Hawaii Prepaid
Health Care Act is not an exercise of the state's taxing power because it does not require payment to
the state as a state).
155. Telephone Interview with Susan Sherry, Consumer Representative, Massachusetts Study
Commission on Financing and Delivery Reform (Feb. 22, 1990).
156. See SLOWLY BUT SURELY, supra note 15, at 7-9.
157. Canada Health Act, ch. 6, §§ 1-23, 1984 S.C. 273 (Can.).
158. Id. § 10. See also WILLIAM S. COMANOR, NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE IN ONTARIO:
THE EFFECTS OF A POLICY OF COST CONTROL 2 (1980).
159. Maurice Leclair, The Canadian Health Care System, in NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE:
CAN WE LEARN FROM CANADA? 11, 15 (Spyros Andreopoulos ed., 1975).
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of Canadian residents are insured.160
The Medicare program is an umbrella for the ten provincial health
insurance programs.1 61 Because each province administers an independ-
ent insurance program within federal guidelines, the states can effectively
pattern programs after the provincial programs without the implementa-
tion of an American national health insurance plan. The provincial gov-
ernments administer their programs through a single public authority. 162
Each province is required to make insurance benefits available to its resi-
dents on "uniform terms and conditions." 163 A resident is defined as a
person "lawfully entitled to be or to remain in Canada who makes his
home in Canada and is ordinarily present in the province, but does not
include a tourist, a transient, or a visitor in the province."' 16
The Canadian government requires that all provincial insurance
programs include benefits for accommodations, meals, nursing services,
laboratory services, diagnostic services, drugs, surgical services, and
physical therapy.1 65 Some provinces provide additional services such as
mental health, emergency, and outpatient services.1 66 Other optional
services include family planning, plastic surgery, and surgical dental
services. 67 Residents may also obtain additional health insurance bene-
fits through nonprofit insurance companies.1 68 The provinces fund their
programs through general revenues, premiums, taxes, and copay-
ments,1 69 and continue to provide benefits when a Canadian citizen
leaves a province or loses a job. 170
Whether ERISA will preempt a health insurance plan patterned af-
ter the Canadian Medicare statute is uncertain. State health insurance
program advocates argue that ERISA will not preempt programs
160. Id.
161. See Canada Health Act, ch. 6, §§ 1-23. See generally Robert G. Evans, Beyond the Medical
Marketplace" Expenditur Utilization, and Pricing of the Insured in Canada, in NATIONAL HEALTH
INSURANCE: CAN WE LEARN FROM CANADA? 129, 129 (Spyros Andreopoulos ed., 1975).
162. Canada Health Act, ch. 6, § 8. See also Evans, supra note 161, at 129-130.
163. Canada Health Act, ch. 6, § 12.
164. Id. § 2. See also Evans, supra note 161, at 129; Leclair, supra note 159, at 28.
165. Canada Health Act, ch. 6, § 2. See also Leclair, supra note 159, at 30.
166. STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM. OF THE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 94TH CONG., 2D
SEss., NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE RESOURCE BOOK 297 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter NA-
TIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE RESOURCE BooK.].
167. Id.; Leclair, supra note 159, at 36.
168. NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 166, at 297-307.
169. Id. at 301; Evans, supra note 161, at 131.
170. NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 166, at 305; Evans, supra
note 161, at 130.
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modeled after the Canadian statute.1 71 A state advocating such a pro-
gram could argue that mandated insurance is not an employee benefit,
but an equal benefit to all persons in the state.1 72 Furthermore, a state
could argue that ERISA may not prohibit the use of its taxing power to
levy a payroll tax on all employers to fund coverage for the uninsured.
17 1
The Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Michigan, Minne-
sota, Missouri, Ohio, and Washington state legislatures have considered
bills for the implementation of a state insurance program patterned after
the Canadian Medicare program, however, similar legislation has not yet
been enacted. 174
VI. CHALLENGES FACING STATE LEGISLATURES IN MEETING THE
NEEDS OF THE UNINSURED
State legislatures implementing programs for the uninsured must
overcome the challenges associated with program administration, in-
creased cost, and government control of the health care system. Despite
the numerous strategies designed by state governments to meet the needs
of the uninsured, no state has successfully overcome these problems.
Although Americans are demanding a greater number and higher quality
of health care services, these challenges frequently cause state legislatures
to refuse to enact state insurance programs. While the nation debates the
implementation of a national health insurance program, the states may
successfully decrease the size of the uninsured population. In order to
implement successful programs, however, state legislators and their con-
stituents must have a thorough understanding of the challenges they face.
A. Administering a State Health Insurance Program: Cost, Eligibility,
and Benefits
A successful state insurance program will contain costs, increase ac-
cess to health care, provide a power balance between the government and
health care providers, and maintain competition in the health care mar-
ket. In order to meet these goals, state legislatures must decide who is
171. Telephone Interview with Susan Sherry, Consumer Representative, Massachusetts Study
Commission on Financing and Delivery Reform (Feb. 22, 1990).
172. Telephone Interview with Julie K. Koegel, Coordinator, Indiana Health Care Campaign
(Feb. 18, 1990).
173. See Bovbjerg & Kopit, supra note 8, at 907-08.
174. Indiana Health Care Campaign, Citizens Action Leadership in State Health Campaigns (In-
diana Health Care Campaign, Indianapolis, IN) (Jan. 1990) (on file with author).
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entitled to health care benefits under the program.175 For example, a
state legislature must decide whether the program will provide health
care services for a child in a neighboring state who has a parent who is a
state resident.176 A state legislature must also decide whether to require
coverage for an insured's dependent parents and whether to grant reci-
procity for other states' insurance plans. The work needed to identify
employees' dependents and transient residents will increase program
costs.
Once program recipients are identified, providers must have the re-
sources to provide services to eligible persons.1 77 Thus, a state must bal-
ance its providers' economic problems against its residents' needs. 178 By
attempting to provide equal health care access to all state residents, state
health insurance programs encourage the rationing of health care re-
sources. 17 9 Rationing assumes a governmental duty to establish criteria
for allocating resources.1 80 When rationing occurs, residents may com-
plain that physicians are overworked, long lines exist for care, and exam-
inations are rushed. 8' State health insurance programs may provide the
uninsured with the opportunity to receive care, but that care may seem
inadequate compared to the services received by those fortunate enough
to have private insurance. 82 The goal of any health insurance program,
however, is to increase access to care. Consequently, consumers may be
required to trade efficiency for increased access. 8
B. Taxing Employers to Finance State Health Insurance Costs
The primary issue in program implementation is cost. Programs fi-
nanced by taxing employers create unique problems. A state legislature
implementing an employer-financed program must consider: (1) changes
in employee compensation; (2) efficiency in health services; (3) the effects
175. Telephone Interview with Julie K. Koegel, Coordinator, Indiana Health Care Campaign
(Feb. 18, 1990).
176. Id.
177. See Hudson, supra note 41, at 46.
178. See James F. Blumstein, Financing Uncompensated Care: An Approach to the Issues, 38 J.
LEGAL EDuc. 511, 514-17 (1988).
179. Wendy K. Mariner, Prospective Payment for Hospital Services" Social Responsibility and the
Limits of Legal Standards, 17 CUMB. L. REv. 379, 413 (1987).
180. Blumstein, supra note 178, at 513.
181. See Tom Dennis, Canadians Flock to Costly U.S. Health Care, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, March
4, 1990, at A7.
182. Id.
183. But see Aaron Wildavsky, Doing Better and Feeling Worse: The Political Pathology of
Health Policy, in DOING BETrER AND FEELING VORSE: HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES 105, 106
(John H. Knowles ed., 1977) (better access is not the same as better health).
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on multistate firms; and (4) the program's goals. Unless a state legisla-
ture considers each of these factors, an employer-financed health insur-
ance program may fail.
First, increased worker compensation through mandatory state
health insurance benefits may cause a decrease in wages.18 4 Employees
may prefer increased wages to expanded health insurance coverage or
any health insurance coverage at all."'8 For example, under traditional
health insurance plans, most workers do not apply for dental, vision, or
hearing benefits," 6 yet these benefits may be included in state health in-
surance plans. Employees reject these benefits because they need mone-
tary compensation and they do not expect to benefit from additional
coverage.1 7 However, people have different needs and under state insur-
ance programs, employees may receive benefits they do not want and do
not expect to use.1 "'
The second consideration for implementing employer-financed pro-
grams is efficiency in health services delivery. State legislators should
remember that inefficient services will lead to consumer dissatisfaction
and increased program costs. Taxing employers to finance state health'
insurance programs does not encourage the efficient use of health care
services. Once employees are forced to accept additional health insur-
ance benefits, they are more likely to demand unnecessary health care
services. 1 89 Thus, extensive health insurance coverage gives neither pa-
tients nor providers an incentive to use the health care system effi-
ciently.190 Under employer-financed programs, the working population
will enjoy insurance coverage, but persons who are too sick to work will
remain unemployed and uninsured.1 91
The national scope of many businesses presents a third obstacle to
employer-financed health insurance. As the lawyers representing Stan-
dard Oil argued, multistate firms incur financial problems when state leg-
islatures attempt to meet uninsured residents' needs by taxing employers.
184. Uwe E. Reinhardt, Health Insurance for the Nation's Poor, 6 HEALTH AFF. 101, 107
(1987).
185. See COMANOR, supra note 158, at 6.
186. Gail R. Wilensky et al., Variations in Health Insurance Coverage: Benefits vi Premiums, 62
MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 53, 56-57 (1984) [hereinafter Wilensky, Variations].
187. See id.
188. See DOUGHERTY, supra note 3, at 55.
189. Victor R. Fuchs, The "Competition Revolution" in Health Care, 7 HEALTH AFF. 5, 21
(1988); Wilensky, Variations, supra note 186, at 75.
190. Marc L. Berk et al., How the US. Spent Its Health Care Dollar: 1929-1980, 7 HEALTH
AFF. 46, 47 (1988).
191. Davis & Rowland, supra note 3, at 165.
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Multistate firms may have health insurance programs that provide work-
ers in different states with comparable benefit packages. When a state
health insurance statute requires employers to provide health insurance
in any benefit arrangement, multistate firms will incur increased ex-
penses, but the statute will not disrupt their benefit programs. On the
other hand, when a state health insurance statute requires employers to
provide specific health insurance benefits, it will disrupt the company's
benefit programs.192 In states where specific health insurance benefits are
not required, company employees may receive more wages and fewer in-
surance benefits. In states where specific insurance benefits are required,
however, employees may receive more insurance and fewer wages. This
compensation disparity may hurt large businesses' ability to compete for
valuable human resources. 193
Finally, a state legislature considering an employer-financed health
insurance program must clearly define the program's goals. The pro-
gram's secondary effect on employment levels and the program's ability
to provide adequate benefits must be monitored and evaluated. Funding
state programs by taxing employers may lead to a declining employment
level.' 94 An increase in labor costs may lead to a decline in employ-
ment. 9 ' A state's labor force will experience this decline when higher
compensation levels increase labor costs. Furthermore, when part-tine
and seasonal workers are excepted from health insurance requirements,
employers may lie about a worker's status, hire more part-time workers,
or discharge workers before they become eligible for insurance. 196
An employer's selection of benefits may result in further complica-
tions. Employers may attempt to meet program requirements by provid-
ing health insurance that covers only nominal health care services. If a
192. But see Hearings, supra note 95, at 94 (statement of Honorable Spark M. Matsunaga, U.S.
Senator, Hawaii) (multistate companies' benefit packages will not be disrupted by the Hawaii Pre-
paid Health Care Act because the Act's requirements are lower than the benefits these companies
extend).
193. David M. Kinzer, Why the Conservatives Gave Us Universal Health Care: A Parable, 34
Hosp. & HEALTH SERVICES ADMi. 299, 308 (1989). See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 118F, § 1
(West Supp. 1991) ("It is hereby found and declared:... That, the inability of certain businesses to
offer health insurance benefits to their employees is a hindrance to their ability to compete for capa-
ble employees in the labor market and therefore has a negative economic impact on the
commonwealth.").
194. Monheit, Public Policy, supra note 13, at 360-61.
195. There is evidence that a 10% increase in labor costs may lead to a 0.5-1.0% decline in
employment. Michele L. Robinson, Mandatory Insurance: Tough Choices Ahead, HOsPITALs, Nov.
20, 1988, at 40.
196. Sager, Universal Health, supra note 127, at 277. See Scandlen, supra note 121, at 7.
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state plan requires coverage for services typically included in an em-
ployer-sponsored health benefit plan, workers may not receive the bene-
fits they want or need and may be unable to purchase these services
themselves. According to economists, consumers express their prefer-
ences through economic votes cast when they use health care services. 197
Therefore, the test to evaluate a program's performance is whether "it
give[s] reasonable individuals what they want and only what they want, in
the sense that, understanding the alternatives, they would purchase it for
themselves assuming their income [is] not below a certain level." 198 A
state insurance plan fails this test when workers must purchase insurance
with resources apart from those appropriated by the state government for
health insurance.
C. Government Intervention in the Health Care System
Individuals who oppose state health insurance programs argue that
they give state governments too much control over medical resource allo-
cation. The rebuttal to this argument is that cost control is waste control
and therefore, state insurance programs must support cost control. 199
Consequently, state legislatures will determine who will receive health
insurance benefits and what resources will be used to provide those bene-
fits. A state government should not fulfill the provider role by redistrib-
uting income to provide purchasing power for the poor.2°° Nonetheless,
when a government allocates available medical resources and defines in-
dividual insurance coverage, it is acting as a health care provider.
When state insurance programs dictate physician payment and re-
source utilization, medical innovation may decline. Physicians who fear
that the government will not reimburse them for new procedures may
become reluctant to try new treatment protocols.20 1 Similarly, shortages
of health care professionals will worsen if resources are not allocated to
areas suffering shortages. State legislatures must balance these consider-
ations because "however much [they] wish to reduce costs and increase
197. Blumstein, supra note 178, at 513.
198. Clark C. Havighurst & James F. Blumstein, Coping with Quality/Cost Trade-Offs in Medi-
cal Care: The Role of PSROs, 70 Nw. U. L. REV. 6, 15 (1975).
199. See Blumstein, supra note 178, at 511. See also COMANOR, supra note 158, at 48.
200. Rand E. Rosenblatt, Health Care, Marketjs and Democratic Values, 34 VAND. L. REV.
1067, 1109 (1981).
201. Compare Mariner, supra note 179, at 395 (government control causing restraint of physi-
cian behavior examined within the Medicare prospective payment system) with Sager, Universal
Health, supra note 127, at 269 (concluding that the Health Security Act does not involve physicians
or their patterns of practice).
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efficiency, [they] must not reduce the financial carrot below what provid-
ers actually need to survive."'2 2
In contrast to a government insurance program, a market approach
promotes economic creativity in the generation of new services.20 3 When
a market approach is used, legislators will focus on efficiency rather than
equity204 and will promote competitive markets before they redistribute
purchasing power.1° s Competition promotes efficient health care utiliza-
tion and delivery.2° In a competitive model, consumers make voluntary
transactions in which they balance marginal economic costs against mar-
ginal health benefits.20 7 Yet, consumers cannot express their needs
through purchase selections when the services available to them are lim-
ited. Although removing new and costly services from state health insur-
ance programs will conserve resources, the public must decide that it is
willing to increase access to health care by sacrificing individual choice
and medical innovation.
VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
State legislatures are beginning to meet the needs of the uninsured
by implementing legislation to provide insurance for their state's resi-
dents.2 8 Traditionally, state governments, through their general police
power, have the authority to provide and finance health care.20 9 Some
scholars deny that state legislatures can produce policies that will resolve
health care problems,210 and maintain that direct federal involvement is
needed to finance American health care.21'
Advocates of state health insurance programs see state programs as
a step toward national health insurance.21 These advocates doubt that
state legislatures will succeed in administering health insurance programs
202. Mariner, supra note 179, at 387.
203. DOUGHERTY, supra note 3, at 136.
204. Blumstein, supra note 178, at 517.
205. See Rosenblatt, supra note 200, at 1109.
206. See id.
207. Id. at 1070, 1088. See also DOUGHERTY, supra note 3, at 137.
208. For a discussion of the most recent and innovative state programs, see SLOWLY BUT
SURELY, supra note 15, at 16-29.
209. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 583 (1975) (Burger J., concurring); Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24 (1905).
210. See Thompson, supra note 31, at 654-55.
211. See Reinhardt, supra note 184, at 108.
212. Telephone Interview with Julie K. Koegel, Coordinator, Indiana Health Care Campaign
(Feb. 18, 1990); Telephone Interview with Susan Sherry, Consumer Representative, Massachusetts
Study Commission on Financing and Delivery Reform (Feb. 22, 1990).
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without federal support.2 13 As the states enact differing programs, these
advocates hope that national health insurance will become a reality.21 4
Yet, a single level of medical care may not meet every person's needs.
Consequently state legislatures may be in a better position than the fed-
eral government to identify state residents' health care needs. 215
State programs for the uninsured are costly. Because state govern-
ments will control program funding, they will have a greater influence on
private medical practice. Increased government control provokes argu-
ments that state health insurance programs promote health care ration-
ing without allowing natural market forces to work. In addition, when
state health insurance programs are implemented, consumers must
change their expectations of resource allocation and the efficiency of
health care services.
State residents must decide whether they are willing to alter their
expectations to facilitate successful state programs for the uninsured.
State programs for the uninsured have disadvantages, but with the coop-
eration of state residents and health care professionals, they can curb the
growth of the uninsured population. Justice Brandeis once expressed his
support for state innovation by writing:
Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious conse-
quences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve
as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments with-
out risk to the rest of the country.216
If cost, access, and competition are considered in the planning of state
programs, our states may become the pioneers in slowing the growth of
our nation's uninsured population.
213. See Fitzhugh Mullan, Poor People, Poor Policy: Government Programs for the Disadvan-
taged, 6 HEALTH AF. 113, 116 (1987).
214. U.S. BIPARTISAN COMM'N ON COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH CARE, 101ST CONG., 2D SESS.,
AccEss TO HEALTH CARE AND LONG-TERM CARE FOR ALL AMERICANS (March 2, 1990).
215. See Blumstein, supra note 178, at 523; Hudson, supra note 41, at 46.
216. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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